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Abstract I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revi-
sion operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting
similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM
belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical
consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivi-
alization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily
equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without
resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics.
The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a
simple mereology of contents.
Keywords Framing effects  Hyperintensionality  Belief revision  Non-
monotonicreasoning  Doxastic logic  Epistemic logic  Inconsistent
belief management
1 Introduction
Standard AGM belief revision theory imposes a high amount of idealization on
cognitive agents who revise their beliefs in the light of new information1. The first
postulate for belief revision in Alchourro´n et al. (1985), (K  1), has it that K  /
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(belief set K after revision by /) is closed under the full strength of classical logical
consequence. Postulate (K  5) trivializes belief sets revised in the light of
inconsistent information2: if / is a logical inconsistency, then K  / ¼ K?, the
trivial belief set; agents who revise via inconsistent inputs trivially believe
everything. And postulate (K  6) requires that, if / and w are logically equivalent,
then K  / ¼ K  w, that is, revising by either gives the same belief set.
These principles are rather implausible for agents like us all. Against (K  1), our
belief states need not be closed under classical logical consequence (perhaps under
any kind of monotonic logical consequence: see e.g. Jago (2014) for extended
discussion). Against (K  5), we do not trivially believe everything just because we
occasionally hold inconsistent beliefs, and we should not be modeled as undergoing
a trivialization of our belief system just because we can be, as we occasionally are,
exposed to inconsistent information. Against (K  6), it is well known that how we
revise our beliefs, as well as our preferences, is subject to what psychologists call
framing effects (Kahneman and Tversky 1984): logically or necessarily equivalent
contents can trigger different revisions depending on how they are presented.
Agents may revise their beliefs in one way when told they have 60% chances of
succeeding in a task, in another way when told they have 40% chances of failing.
There are obvious connections between such idealization phenomena and the so-
called problem of logical omniscience: a cluster of closure conditions on knowledge
and/or belief, which come as a spin-off of the characterization of such notions as
restricted quantifiers over possible worlds employed since Hintikka (1962):
(H) B/ is true at w iff / is true at all w1 such that wRw1
Here B stands for the relevant (non-agent-indexed) cognitive state (knowledge,
belief); R  W W is the usual accessibility relation on the space of worlds
W. Cognitive agents know or believe all logical truths, know or believe all the
logical consequences of what they know or believe, and never have inconsistent
beliefs. It is widely agreed (see e.g. Fagin et al. 1995, pp. 34–35; Meyer 2001, p.
186) that this gives implausibly idealized notions of knowledge and belief, having
little to do with human cognition.3
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While work on belief bases (sets of beliefs not closed under logical consequence,
see Hansson 1999) has gone a long way towards reducing the idealization in the
original AGM approach, this is still very much present in static and dynamic
doxastic and epistemic logics, which aim at recapturing AGM within a modal
language with appropriate formal semantics and proof theory. The reason is, plainly,
that such approaches build their conditional belief or dynamic belief revision
operators on top of a largely standard, normal modal framework.
Works such as Spohn (1988), Segerberg (1995), Lindstro¨m and Rabinowicz
(1999), Board (2004), van Ditmarsch (2005), Asheim and So¨vik (2005), Leitgeb and
Segerberg (2005), van Benthem (2007, 2011), van Ditmarsch et al. (2007), Baltag
and Smets (2008), Girard and Rott (2014), usually include operators for conditional
belief, B/w (‘Conditional on /, it is believed that w’, or ‘It is believed that w after
receiving the information that /’), or for belief revision, ½/Bw (‘After revision by
/, it is believed that w’), which closely mirror the original AGM postulates. As for
(K  6), for instance, such logics will typically satisfy (model-theoretic) principles
like the following:
If /$ w, then ½/v$ ½wv
If /$ w, then B/v$ Bwv
Such modal operators for belief revision or conditional belief are, thus, merely
intensional, that is, incapable of detecting differences (often called hyperinten-
sional) more fine-grained than ordinary modal ones: when / and w are logically or
necessarily equivalent, they can be replaced salva veritate as indexes in ½. . . and
B.... However, again, this is not how real people revise their beliefs and plausibility
judgments.
The framing effect is but a special case of a broader fact: thought is
hyperintensional. Our (propositional) mental states—believing, supposing, desiring,
hoping, fearing—can treat logically or necessarily equivalent contents differently:
Lois Lane can wish that Superman is in love with her without wishing that Clark
Kent is in love with her, although (if Barcan Marcus and Kripke are right) it is
metaphysically impossible for Superman to be other than Clark Kent. We can
conceive that 75  12 ¼ 900 without conceiving that Fermat’s Last Theorem is
true; but given the necessity of mathematical truths, the two make for the same
content or proposition in possible worlds semantics: the total set of worlds.
In this paper, I aim at modeling agents whose belief revision processes are
sensitive to framing effects; who can hold inconsistent beliefs without thereby
believing everything; who are safe from various other forms of logical omni-
science.4 Conservative logicians may take as an advantage of the approach proposed
Footnote 3 continued
research, e.g., in Levi (1991). This leaves us in want of a logical account of knowledge and belief for real
agents, as opposed to some conditional commitment.
4 I do not aim at modeling agents free from any kind of logical omniscience, so our theory still includes
an amount of idealization. It seems to me that a framework for epistemic logic should strike a balance
between two desiderata that pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, it should yield enough logical
structure to justify the use of formal logical tools. On the other hand, it should allow us to reason about
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below, that it models the aforementioned hyperintensional phenomena without
weakening the underlying classical and (normal) modal logic (as it happens, e.g., in
paraconsistent logics for the management of inconsistent information: see Tanaka
et al. 2013), and without resorting to so-called non-normal or impossible worlds
(Kiourti 2010; Berto 2013), which have often been proposed as a tool to deal with
logical omniscience (see Rantala 1982; Wansing 1990; Nolan 1997; Jago
2007, 2014). It employs, instead, only semantic notions acceptable by, and already
available in the toolkit of, a classical modal logician (I will mention, though, a
revenge of non-classical frameworks in a footnote below).
Another feature of the approach is its simplicity. It takes its cue from a single,
plain insight: we should take at face value the view of beliefs as (propositional)
representational mental states bearing intentionality, that is, being about states of
affairs, situations, or circumstances which make for their content. Arguably, it is
precisely the aboutness of such intentional states that can account for many of their
hyperintensional features: when we think that 75  12 ¼ 900, our thought is about
these very integers, not about diophantine equations, elliptical curves, or else. As we
will see, the discriminating powers of the standard possible worlds apparatus may
improve when we supplement it with a simple mereology of contents—what the
relevant intentional (doxastic) states are about.
The semantics proposed below makes for a very basic set-up: we consider a
single-agent setting with a propositional language and only one binary operator
expressing conditional belief, or disposition to belief revision, B/w [read:
‘Conditional on /, the agent believes w’, or: ‘After revising by /, the agent
believes w’: belief revision is understood as ‘belief change in the indicative
(conditional) mood’, Leitgeb and Segerberg 2005, p. 186]. In this, we follow the
framework of non-dynamic doxastic logics such as Board (2004) (see also Asheim
and So¨vik 2005; Bonanno 2005). B is understood, as we will see, as a variably strict
quantifier over possible worlds with a content-containment requirement. It involves
no model transformations, as it happens in dynamic epistemic logics such as van
Benthem (2007) and Baltag and Smets (2008) (for an overview, see van Benthem
and Smets 2015). The latter approach has the advantage of embedding information
on how the plausibility agents assign to scenarios is globally re-arranged after belief
revision, thus allowing the modeling of iterated revisions (see the discussion in van
Ditmarsch 2005, pp. 269–270). But the former approach, a` la Board, has the
advantage of allowing a simple inspection of the hyperintensional features of our
operator. How to expand our semantics in various dynamic directions may be the
subject of future work.
Footnote 4 continued
the epistemic states of agents that are of genuine interest. The former requirement pulls towards modeling
infallible agents with heavily idealized cognitive powers. The latter can easily lead to very complex
frameworks, or to logics that are too weak to be of serious interest.
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2 A Hyperintensional Semantics
We have a propositional language L with an indefinitely large set LAT of atomic
formulas, p, q, r (p1; p2; . . .), negation :, conjunction ^, disjunction _, a strict
conditional , the belief operator B, round parentheses as auxiliary symbols (, ). We
use /, w, v,..., as metavariables for formulas of L. The well-formed formulas are
items in LAT and, if / and w are formulas:
:/ j ð/ ^ wÞ j ð/ _ wÞ j ð/  wÞ j B/w
We identify L with the set of its well-formed formulas. A frame for L is a tuple F =
hW ; fR/ j / 2 Lg; C;; ci, understood as follows. W is a set of possible worlds.
fR/ j / 2 Lg is a set of accessibilities between worlds, where each / 2 L has its
own R/  W W . These satisfy a number of conditions, to which we come in a
minute. C is a set of contents. We should understand contents as the situations (the
configurations of objects and properties) the formulas of L involved in belief
ascriptions are about. In the metalanguage I use variables w;w1;w2; . . ., ranging
over possible worlds, x; y; z ðx1; x2; . . .Þ, ranging over contents, as well as the
symbols );,;&; or; 	 ; 8; 9, with the usual reading.  is content fusion, a binary
operation on C making of contents part of larger contents and satisfying, for all
xyz 2 C:
• (Idempotence) x x ¼ x
• (Commutativity) x y ¼ y x
• (Associativity) ðx yÞ  z ¼ x ðy zÞ
We assume unrestricted fusion, that is,  is always defined on C:
8xy 2 C 9z 2 Cðz ¼ x yÞ. We then define content parthood, 
 , the usual way:
8xy 2 Cðx





 y & y
 x) x ¼ y
• (Transitivity) x
 y & y
 z ) x
 z
Thus, hC;i is a join semilattice. We may also assume that C is complete: any set of
contents S  C has a fusion S. Finally, we can think of all contents in C as built via
fusions out of atoms, contents with no proper parts (AtomðxÞ , 	9yðy\xÞ, with
\ the strict order defined from 
 ), which we stipulate to be at the bottom of our
semilattice.
hC;i is needed to assign contents to formulas of L, as follows. Our c in F above
is a function c : LAT ! C, such that if p 2 LAT , then cðpÞ 2 fx 2 CjAtomðxÞg:
atomic contents are assigned to atomic formulas (this is an idealization, for
grammatically simple sentences of ordinary language can be about intuitively
complex contents; but it will streamline the discussion below). Next, c is extended
to the whole of L as follows. if At/ ¼ fp1; . . .; png, the set of atoms in /, then:
• cð/Þ ¼ At/ ¼ cðp1Þ      cðpnÞ
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A formula is about what its atoms, taken together, are about. This mereology of
contents (of which a more refined version is Peter Hawke’s issue-based theory: see
Hawke (2017)) entails, by induction on the construction of formulas, that cð/Þ ¼
cð::/Þ (recall Frege on the Sinn-preservation of Double Negation); but also that
cð/Þ ¼ cð:/Þ: a formula is about what its negation is about. And not only
cð/ ^ wÞ ¼ cð/ ^ wÞ, but also, e.g., cð/ ^ wÞ ¼ cð/Þ  cðwÞ ¼ cð/ _ wÞ. In the
literature, these are often taken as key requirements for a good account of
aboutness- or content-inclusion (see Yablo 2014, p. 42; Fine 2015, p. 1).5
A model M = hW ; fR/ j / 2 Lg; C;; c;i is a frame with an interpretation
  W  LAT , relating worlds to atoms: we read ‘wp’ as meaning that p is true at
w, ‘w1 p’ as 	wp.  is extended to all formulas of L via the recursive semantic
clauses:
• (S:) w:/, w1/
• (S^) w/ ^ w, w/ & ww
• (S_) w/ _ w, w/ or ww
• (S) w/  w, 8w1ðw1/) w1wÞ
• (SB) wB/w, 8w1ðwR/w1 ) w1wÞ & cðwÞ
 cð/Þ
Read ‘wR/w1’ as meaning that w1 is, from w’s viewpoint, one of the most plausible
worlds where / is true. (SB) can be equivalently expressed using set-selection
functions (as in Lewis 1973, pp. 57–60). Each / 2 L comes with a function f/ :
W ! PðWÞ selecting the set of most plausible /-worlds,
f/ðwÞ ¼ fw1 2 W jwR/w1g. If j/j ¼ fw 2 W jw/g, we can compactly rephrase
the clause for B as:
• (SB) wB/w, f/ðwÞ  jwj & cðwÞ
 cð/Þ
The two formulations are equivalent as wR/w1 , w1 2 f/ðwÞ. However, either
formulation is at times handier than the other to make specific points. For a
conditional belief in w given /, or a disposition to believe w after revising by /, we
ask, thus, two things at once. First, we have a truth-conditional requirement: that w
be true throughout the most plausible worlds where / is true. Second, we have a
content containment requirement: that w allows no content alien to / to sneak in.
For the R/’s or f/’s to really capture plausibility, or disposition to revise one’s
beliefs, we characterize them via a Lewisian system of spheres as in Lewis
(1973, pp. 57–59). In the Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals, sphere systems or,
equivalently, orderings of worlds, are to capture objective world similarity. In the
5 As highlighted by an anonymous referee of this journal, there are connections between such a modeling
of aboutness via a mereology of contents, and the formalization of awareness in awareness logics (the
seminal work in this area is Fagin and Halpern 1988). In a sense, this is not surprising, given the intuitive
link between the idea of concepts an epistemic agent is aware of, and contents its intentional states are
about. The version of awareness logic closest to our framework is the one in terms of ‘awareness
generated by primitive propositions’ (see Schipper 2015, p. 81), where an agent is aware of a formula /
just in case it is aware of all of its atomic constituents, taken together. The essential role of content-
inclusions will be to allow us to capture a certain relevance in belief revision. Works formalizing how
belief change is sensitive to issues of relevance include Del Cerro and Herzig (1996), Chopra and Parikh
(2000), Hansson and Wassermann (2002), Peppas et al. (2015).
F. Berto
123
context of belief revision and in models inspired by the Grove (1988) reformulation,
spheres are to represent, instead, subjective dispositions to revise beliefs, or
preferred ‘fallback’ positions after revisions, hence our talk of plausibility above. In
Leitgeb and Segerberg’s words:
In the case of belief revision the agent tries to change his beliefs in a manner
such that the worlds that he subsequently believes to be in comprise the
subjectively most plausible deviation from the worlds he originally believed to
inhabit. (Leitgeb and Segerberg 2005, p. 185)
We thus have a function, $, assigning to each w a finite set of subsets of W (the
spheres), $ðwÞ ¼ fSw0 ; Sw1 ; . . .; Swn g, with n 2 N, such that Sw0  Sw1      Swn ¼ W .
Next, for each / 2 L and w 2 W , f/ðwÞ is characterized as follows: if j/j ¼ ;, then
f/ðwÞ ¼ ;. Otherwise, f/ðwÞ ¼ Swi \ j/j, where Swi 2 $ðwÞ is the smallest sphere
such that Swi \ j/j 6¼ ;. Because the spheres around each w are assumed to be finite,
the system satisfies Lewis’ Limit Assumption: the existence of a smallest such Swi
for each w 2 W and / 2 L is automatically guaranteed.
The system satisfies various conditions,6 some of which will be useful in the
following:
• (C1) f/ðwÞ  j/j
• (C2) j/j 6¼ ; ) f/ðwÞ 6¼ ;
• (C3) f/ðwÞ  jwj & fwðwÞ  j/j ) f/ðwÞ ¼ fwðwÞ
• (C4) f/ðwÞ \ jwj 6¼ ; ) f/^wðwÞ  f/ðwÞ
Notice that we do not demand that w 2 Sw0 , that is, the relevant world be in the
innermost sphere: in Lewis’ terminology, we have a system of spheres which is not
even weakly centered. That’s because our spheres do not express objective world
similarity, but subjective world plausibility, or belief entrenchment. The innermost
sphere at the core, Sw0 , gives the most plausible worlds for the agent located at
w. w itself need not be among the innermost worlds, for the agent may have false
beliefs.
Finally, logical consequence is defined the standard way, as truth preservation at
all worlds of all models (based on our system of spheres generated by $—we will
omit mentioning it each time). With R a set of formulas:
Rw, in all models M = hW ; fR/ j / 2 Lg; C;; c;i and for all w 2 W:
w/ for all / 2 R) ww
For single-premise entailment, I write /w for f/gw. As a special case, logical
validity, /, truth at all worlds of all models, is ;/, entailment by the empty set of
premises.7
6 Proof by checking Priest (2001), pp. 91, 92.
7 I have used a semantics quite similar to the one just presented (save for the lack of a plausibility metric
on worlds) in Berto (2017a), to model a sort of imagination, understood as reality-oriented mental
simulation. An antecedent of this kind of semantics, based on the idea of content-preservation, is to be
found in works on ‘analytic implication’ such as Angell (1977), Fine (1986), French (2017). For a useful
survey, see Ferguson (2014).
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The logic induced by the semantics for the extensional operators is just classical
propositional, with  a strict S5-like conditional (i.e., one equivalent to the
necessitation of a material conditional, where the relevant necessity is S5). The
novelty comes with B/w, whose logical behavior we are now going to unpack.
As we shall see, the B operator is essentially non-monotonic. As we go through
its features, thus, it will be worth comparing8 the pattern of validities and
invalidities we meet with the general framework for non-monotonic logics of Kraus
et al. (1990). Their seminal work investigates non-monotonic consequence relations
‘/ j	w’ (read: ‘w is a plausible consequence of /’, or ‘Given /, one defeasibly
jumps to the conclusion that w’). Their basic non-monotonic system, called C,
satisfies what, according to Gabbay (1985), are three minimal inferential schemata
any non-monotonic consequence must comply with, namely Reflexivity (/ j	/),
Cut (If / j	w and / ^ w j	 v, then / j	 v) and Weak or Cautious Monotonicity (If
/ j	w and / j	 v, then / ^ w j	 v). But C also satisfies two more conditions, called
Left Logical Equivalence (If / and w are logically equivalent, and / j	 v, then
w j	 v) and Right Weakening (If / j	w, and w logically entails v, then / j	 v). We
will see that our hyperintensional belief operator B does comply with the minimal
Gabbay conditions. However, the counterparts of Left Logical Equivalence and
Right Weakening fail for it in our semantics—-and rightly so, for their failure is at
the core of the hyperintensionality of B.
3 Success, Conjunction, Non-monotonicity
To begin with, Condition C1 guarantees that our belief operator satisfies a principle
corresponding to the Success postulate of AGM:
(Success)  B//
[Proof By C1, for any w and w1, wR/w1 ) w1/, and of course cð/Þ
 cð/Þ.]
Success guarantees that, after revising by /, one does believe /. The next
validities show that conditional belief is closed with respect to conjunction
introduction and elimination:
(Simplification) B/ðw ^ vÞB/ w B/ðw ^ vÞB/v
[Proof we do the first one (for the second, replace w with v appropriately). Let
wB/ðw ^ vÞ. By (SB), for all w1 such that wR/w1, w1w ^ v, thus by (S^), w1w.
Also, cðw ^ vÞ ¼ cðwÞ  cðvÞ
 cð/Þ, thus cðwÞ
 cð/Þ. Then, by (SB) again,
wB/w.]
If, after revising by /, you believe w and v, then you believe w (and you also
believe v) after the same revision. The companion of Simplification is:
(Adjunction) fB/w;B/vgB/ðw ^ vÞ
8 As rightly suggested by an anonymous referee of this journal.
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[Proof let wB/w and wB/v, that is, by (SB): for all w1 such that wR/w1, w1w
and w1v, so by (S^) w1/ ^ w. Also, cðwÞ
 cð/Þ and cðvÞ
 cð/Þ, thus
cðwÞ  cðvÞ ¼ cðw ^ vÞ
 cð/Þ. Then, by (SB) again, wB/ðw ^ vÞ.]
If, after revising by /, you believe w and after revising by /, you believe v, then
you believe w and v together after the same revision. Simplification and Adjunction
mirror in the language the idea that, when one comes to believe a certain content,
one believes all of its parts and vice versa. This does impose an amount of
computational idealization. There may be a computational or broadly syntactic
difference between believing that / and that w separately, and believing them
together, and even between believing them together in the order / ^ w and in the
order w ^ /. For instance, ‘a computer program that can determine whether / ^ w
follows from some initial premises in time s might not be able to determine whether
w ^ / follows from those premises in time s’ (Fagin and Halpern 1988, p. 53,
notation modified).
However, this is no difference concerning the scenario represented in the mind of
an intentional agent. Modulo the different attitudes one can have towards the same
content, representing in the mind a configuration of objects and properties making
/ ^ w true is the same as representing one making w ^ / true. Levesque (1984)’s
classic criticism of merely syntactic approaches to knowledge and belief hinges on
this. He makes the point with respect to disjunction:
The syntactic approach [...] is too fine-grained in that it considers any two sets
of sentences as distinct semantic entities and, consequently, different belief
sets. Consider, for example, the disjunction of / and w. There is no reason to
suppose that Bð/ _ wÞ  Bðw _ /Þ would be valid given a syntactic
understanding of B since / _ w may be in the belief set while w _ / may
not. [But] if we consider intuitively what ‘It is believed that either / or w is
true.’ is saying, the order seems to be completely irrelevant [...] / _ w is
believed iff w _ / is because these are two lexical notations for the same
belief. (Levesque 1984, pp. 199–201, notation modified)
If believing has to be taken, not just as mental symbol manipulation, but as an
intentional state endowed with aboutness, then when one believes that w ^ v one
intends a certain scenario in which both the situation described by w and the
situation described by v obtain (and one takes the actual world to be like that). Vice
versa, when one believes that w and that v, one intends a certain scenario, one in
which w obtains and v obtains as well (and one takes, etc.). Then the scenario will
be such that it includes both contents, and one will believe them together. This
provides intuitive justification for Simplification and Adjunction.
Another conjunction-involving feature (this time, an invalidity) displays the non-
monotonic features of belief revision. Our operator is non-monotonic in this sense:
B/w2 B/^vw
[Countermodel let W ¼ fw;w1g, w Rp-accesses nothing, wRp^rw1, w1 1 q,
cðpÞ ¼ cðqÞ ¼ cðrÞ. Then wBpq, but w1Bp^rq.]
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Content is preserved here, for in general if cðwÞ
 cð/Þ, then also
cðwÞ
 cð/Þ  cðvÞ ¼ cð/ ^ vÞ. What does the trick is the variability in strictness
of our operator: f/ðwÞ need not be the same as f/^vðwÞ. After revising your beliefs
via the new information that Mike is in Strasbourg, you come to believe that he is in
France. But if you are informed that Mike is in Strasbourg and that the city has been
annexed by Germany, you will not come to believe that he is in France.
4 Disjunction and Indeterminacy
When, after revising by /, one comes to believe that w, one does not thereby believe
a disjunction between the latter and an unrelated v, although any formula logically
entails the disjunction between itself and something else. Intuitively enough, the
believer need not be aware of that disconnected v at all, or that v might be irrelevant
to the agent’s belief revision policy. Thus we need, and we get:
B/w2 B/ðw _ vÞ:
[Countermodel let W ¼ fw;w1g, wRpw1, w1q, cðpÞ ¼ cðqÞ 6¼ cðrÞ. Then
cðqÞ
 cðpÞ, so by (SB), wBpq. But cðq _ rÞ ¼ cðqÞ  cðrÞ£cðpÞ, thus
w1Bpðq _ rÞ.]
Notice that the inference fails for the right reason: although ww _ v, disjunction
brings in irrelevant, alien content. When informed that Mike is not in France, as you
thought, but in New Zealand, you come to believe that Mike is in Oceania. You do
not thereby automatically believe that Mike is either in Oceania or in planet Kepler-
442b (you may never have heard of Kepler-442b to begin with), though the former
entails the latter.
Another disjunction-involving issue has to do with the fact that beliefs can be
‘nonprime’ due to indeterminacy in the information via which we revise. After
being informed that Mike landed in New Zealand, you come to believe that he is
either in the North Island or in the South Island, but you are not sure which one it is.
Thus, you don’t believe him to be in either rather than the other. So we need, and we
get:
B/ðw _ vÞ2 B/w _ B/v
[Countermodel let W ¼ fw;w1;w2g, wRpw1, wRpw2, w1q but w1 1 r, w2r but
w2 1 q, cðpÞ ¼ cðqÞ ¼ cðrÞ. Then by (S_), w1q _ r and w2q _ r, so for all wx
such that wRpwx, wxq _ r. Also, cðq _ rÞ ¼ cðqÞ  cðrÞ
 cðpÞ, thus by (SB),
wBpðq _ rÞ. However, w1Bpq and w1Bpr for both q and r fail at some Rp-
accessible world. Thus by (S_), w1Bpq _ Bpr.]
Here, too, the inference fails for the right reason. Content-inclusion works: when
one believes that either w or v, one’s state of the mind is about both things, just as
when one believes that w and v (cðw ^ vÞ ¼ cðwÞ  cðvÞ ¼ cðw _ vÞ). But the
different worlds one has access to will fill in the unspecified details in different
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ways. There can be a world where w but not v, and a world where v but not w, and
both can be among the most plausible /-worlds.
5 Hyperintensionality
I now come to interesting invalidities highlighting the hyperintensional features of
belief revision in our models. To begin with, one’s coming to believe that w given /
is not entailed by the corresponding strict conditional or implication:
/  w2 B/w
[Countermodel let W ¼ fw;w1g, wRpw1, w1 p, w1q, cðpÞ 6¼ cðqÞ. By Condition
C1, w1p. Now jpj  jqj, thus by (S), wp  q. But although fpðwÞ  jqj,
cðqÞ£cðpÞ, thus w1Bpq.]
The strict conditional is ‘irrelevant’, in the sense criticized in Anderson and
Belnap (1975), Anderson et al. (1992)’s relevant logic programme: even when all
the /-worlds are w-worlds (thus, all the most plausible /-worlds are w-worlds), w
may have little to do with /. Thus, one can revise one’s beliefs by / but fail to come
to believe that w, although there is no way for / to be true while w is not.
For similar reasons, what is strictly implied by what we come to believe after
revision is not perforce believed in its turn—thus, the counterpart of Kraus et al.
(1990)’s Right Weakening fails:
fB/w;w  vg2 B/v
[Countermodel let W ¼ fw;w1g, wRpw1, w1 q, w1q, w1r, cðpÞ ¼ cðqÞ 6¼ cðrÞ.
Then fpðwÞ  jqj and cðqÞ
 cðpÞ, thus by (SB), wBpq. Also, jqj  jrj, thus by
(S), wq  r. But although fpðwÞ  jrj, cðrÞ£cðpÞ, thus w1Bpr.]
Here, too, the failure happens for the right reason: although all the w-worlds are
v-worlds, thus all the most plausible /-worlds which are w-worlds are v-worlds, the
strict conditional can change the subject. Thus after revision by / one can believe w
but fail to believe v, although there is no way for w to be true while v is not. After
spotting a furry animal running in your garden, you come to believe that there’s a
woodchuck behind home. You need not come to believe, too, that there’s a
groundhog behind home, although there’s no way for something to be a woodchuck
without it being a groundhog: you are just unaware of this latter fact.
Things are different if, after revision, one comes to believe the strict implication
itself. This principle, which might be called Closure under Believed Implication, is
valid:
(CBI) fB/w;B/ðw  vÞgB/v
[Proof let wB/w and wB/ðw  vÞ. By the former and (SB), for all w1 such that
wR/w1, w1w, and cðwÞ
 cð/Þ. By the latter and (SB) again, for all w1 such that
wR/w1, w1w  v, thus given (S) for all w 2 W , if ww then wv. So in
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particular for all w1 such that wR/w1, w1v. Also, cðw  vÞ ¼ cðwÞ  cðvÞ
 cð/Þ,
thus cðvÞ
 cð/Þ. Thus by (SB), wB/v.]
Here both w and w  v come to be believed: after revision by /, the agent
believes both that w and that there is no way for w to be true while v is not. Thus, the
agent’s intentional state is about w as well as v. Then the agent also comes to
believe that v, under the same revision by / (the final proviso is essential: given the
non-monotonic features of B highlighted above, the inference would not be valid
anymore if the revision input were allowed to change across the involved formulas).
As remarked by Yablo (2014, p. 117) (who makes the point about knowledge), this
is plausible enough: coming to believe something entails coming to believe the
believed implications that do not change the subject.
Next, also the counterpart of Kraus et al. (1990)’s Left Logical Equivalence fails
(where /  w abbreviates /  w ^ w  /):
fB/v;/  wg2 Bwv
[Countermodel let W ¼ fw;w1g, wRpw1, wRqw1, w1 p, w1 q, w1r,
cðpÞ ¼ cðrÞ 6¼ cðqÞ. Then fpðwÞ  jrj and cðrÞ
 cðpÞ, thus by (SB), wBpr. Also,
by Condition C1, w1p and w1q, thus jpj  jqj and jqj  jpj. Then by (S) and
(S^), wp  q. But although fqðwÞ  jrj, cðrÞ£cðqÞ, thus w1Bqr.]
Again, failure of aboutness does the trick of differentiating necessarily equivalent
contents. This invalidity allows a proper appreciation of framing effects in our
semantics: after being informed that one’s probability of making it to the short list is
1 / 3, one believes that one should apply for the job. But, against such principles as
AGM’s (K  6), after being informed that one’s probability of failing the short list is
2 / 3, one does not believe that it’s worth applying. There is no way that the chances
of making it are 1 / 3 without the chances of failing being 2 / 3 and vice versa, but
one has been caught into a framing effect.
6 Revising by Inconsistent Information
In our framework, belief revision is not automatically trivialized by incoming
inconsistent information. We already know that, via its content-preservation
constraints, our belief revision has an element of relevance in the sense of relevant
logics. Our S5-ish strict implication is ‘explosive’, ð/ ^ :/Þ  w (trivially: for all
w, w1/ ^ :/.) But, against principles such as AGM’s (K  5), the following
ensures that we do not come to believe arbitrary, irrelevant things just because we
have taken on board explicitly inconsistent information:
2 B/^:/w
[Countermodel let W ¼ fwg, cðpÞ 6¼ cðqÞ. jp ^ :pj ¼ ;, thus fp^:pðwÞ ¼ ;
 jqj.
However, cðqÞ£cðp ^ :pÞ ¼ cðpÞ  cð:pÞ ¼ cðpÞ. Thus, by (SB), w1Bp^:pq.]
Although there is no possible world where a contradiction is true, inconsistent
information may still be about something. In general / ^ :/ is not contentless: its
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content is whatever / is about, and this may not include the content of w (Snow is
white and not white is about snow’s being white, not about grass’ being purple).9
For similar reasons, when we revise by / we do not automatically come to
believe logical validities whose content is irrelevant with respect to /, e.g.:
2 B/ðw  wÞ
2 B/ðw _ :wÞ
[Countermodel (we do the former, the latter is analogue): let W ¼ fwg; cðpÞ 6¼ cðqÞ.
Then although (trivially) fpðwÞ  jq  qj, cðq  qÞ ¼ cðqÞ  cðqÞ ¼ cðqÞ£cðpÞ.
Thus by (SB), w1Bpðq  qÞ.]
7 Equivalents in Plausibility, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity
I close with some important validities warranted with the help of Condition C3
above.10 One may be called a Principle of Equivalents in Plausibility. It allows a
limited recovery of the idea encoded in principles like AGM’s (K  6):
(PEP) fB/w;Bw/;B/vgBwv
9 Here’s where non-classical frameworks get a revenge, though. Even if our B is technically not
explosive, it does satisfy ‘small explosion’ principles like B/^:/^w:w (for, trivially, / ^ :/ ^ w is true
nowhere, and content is preserved here). A framework expanded to include non-normal or impossible
worlds where a contradiction can be true would help against such small detonations. A framework
expanded to include non-normal or impossible worlds where a contradiction can be true would help
against such small detonations. I have used such a framework to model intentional operators in Berto
(2014, 2017b).
10 The behavior in our framework of (counterparts of) AGM principles other than (K  1), (K  2),
(K  5) and (K  6) is somewhat less interesting, for that’s not where the original features of the theory
emerge. We will, however, mention a peculiar asymmetry related to the AGM principles (K  7) and
(K  8). A natural counterpart of (K  7) (see Board 2004, p. 55) fails in our semantics:
f:B/:w;B/^wvg2 B/ðw  vÞ
[Countermodel let W ¼ fwg; fpðwÞ ¼ ;; fp^q ¼ ;; cðpÞ 6¼ cðqÞ ¼ cðrÞ. Then by (SB), w1Bp:q because
cð:qÞ ¼ cðqÞ£cðpÞ, so w:Bp:q; and wBp^qr, because (trivially) fp^qðwÞ  jrj, and
cðrÞ ¼ cðqÞ
 cðpÞ  cðqÞ ¼ cðp ^ qÞ. However, w1Bpðq  rÞ, because
cðq  rÞ ¼ cðqÞ  cðrÞ ¼ cðqÞ£cðpÞ.]
On the other hand, a natural counterpart of (K  8) (see Board 2004, Ibid), obtained by flipping premise
and conclusion in the former, holds:
f:B/:w;B/ðw  vÞgB/^wv
[Proof suppose (a) w:B/:w and (b) wB/ðw  vÞ. By (a) and (S:), w1B/:w, that is: either
f/ðwÞ* j:wj, that is, f/ðwÞ \ jwj 6¼ ;, or cð:wÞ ¼ cðwÞ£cð/Þ. But it can’t be the latter, because by (b)
and (SB), cðw  vÞ ¼ cðwÞ  cðvÞ
 cð/Þ, thus in particular cðwÞ
 cð/Þ; so it must be the former.
Applying Condition C5 to it, f/^wðwÞ  f/ðwÞ. By Condition C1, f/^wðwÞ  j/ ^ wj, so by (S^),
f/^wðwÞ  jwj. By (b) and (SB) again, f/ðwÞ  jw  vj. Putting things together:
f/^wðwÞ  f/ðwÞ  jw  vj, so f/^wðwÞ  jw  vj; and since f/^wðwÞ  jwj, then by modus ponens
f/^wðwÞ  jvj. Also, by (b) again, cðwÞ  cðvÞ
 cð/Þ
 cð/ ^ wÞ, thus cðvÞ
 cð/ ^ wÞ. Thus, by (SB),
wB/^wv.]
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[Proof suppose wB/w, wBw/, wB/v. By (SB), these entail, respectively, (a)
f/ðwÞ  jwj and cðwÞ
 cð/Þ, (b) fwðwÞ  j/j and cð/Þ
 cðwÞ, (c) f/ðwÞ  jvj and
cðvÞ
 cð/Þ. From (a) and (b) we get f/ðwÞ ¼ fwðwÞ (by Condition C3) and cð/Þ ¼
cðwÞ (by antisymmetry of content parthood). From these and (c) we get fwðwÞ  jvj
and cðvÞ
 cðwÞ. Thus by (SB) again, wBwv.]
‘Equivalents in plausibility’ are formulas / and w such that, when we revise by
either, we come to believe the other. PEP says that such equivalents can be replaced
salva veritate as inputs for belief revision: when we revise by either, we come to
have the same beliefs. This seems plausible. B/w: informed that Mike is unmarried,
you come to believe that he is a bachelor. Also, Bw/: informed that Mike is a
bachelor, you come to believe that he is unmarried. Suppose B/v: informed that
Mike is unmarried, you come to believe that he has no marriage allowance. Then the
same happens if you are informed that he is a bachelor, Bwv.
While general transitivity fails for our B as a consequence of its variable
strictness, C3 validates a kind of limited transitivity or Cut principle for belief
revision:
(CUT) fB/w;B/^wvgB/v
[Proof suppose (a) wB/w and (b) wB/^wv. From (a), Success, and Adjunction
we get wB/ð/ ^ wÞ, thus, by (SB), f/ðwÞ  j/ ^ wj and cð/ ^ wÞ
 cð/Þ. Also,
wB/^w/ (from Success B/^wð/ ^ wÞ and Simplification). By (SB)
again,f/^wðwÞ  j/j and (of course) cð/Þ
 cð/ ^ wÞ. Thus, by Condition C3
f/ðwÞ ¼ f/^wðwÞ, and cð/ ^ wÞ ¼ cð/Þ (by antisymmetry of content parthood).
Next, from (b) and (SB) again, f/^wðwÞ  jvj and cðvÞ
 cð/ ^ wÞ. Therefore,
f/^wðwÞ ¼ f/ðwÞ  jvj and cðvÞ
 cð/Þ ¼ cð/ ^ wÞ. Thus by (SB) again, wB/v.]
C3 also validates a converse principle of Cautious Monotonicity:
(CM) fB/w;B/vgB/^wv
[Proof suppose (a) wB/w and (b) wB/v. From (a), Success (B//), and
Adjunction, we get wB/ð/ ^ wÞ, thus by (SB), f/ðwÞ  j/ ^ wj. Also, wB/^w/
(from Success B/^wð/ ^ wÞ and Simplification), so by (SB) again, f/^wðwÞ  j/j.
Then, by Condition C3, f/ðwÞ ¼ f/^wðwÞ. From (b) and (SB) again, we get
f/ðwÞ  jvj, thus f/^wðwÞ  jvj. Also, cðvÞ
 cð/Þ  cðwÞ ¼ cð/ ^ wÞ. Thus,
wB/^wv.]
Cut and Cautious Monotonicity are defended in Board (2004, p. 56), as
‘principles of informational economy’. They correspond to the Cut and Cautious
Monotonicity principles for non-monotonic logic considered in Kraus et al. (1990).
By satisfying these as well as Reflexivity (that’s our Success principle above), our




8 Conclusion and Further Work
This work was just an initial exploration of a simple formal set-up for
hyperintensional belief revision that looks, in my view, promising: it preserves
some good features of more standard approaches while overcoming some problems
due to agent idealization, and achieves so by sticking to a fairly classical modal
framework. The first obvious direction of further work would consist in coming up
with a proof system sound and complete with respect to the above semantics, or
variations thereof.
A second direction would be to develop the set-up following the lines pursued in
dynamic doxastic and epistemic logics such as Baltag and Solecki (1998), Leitgeb
and Segerberg (2005), Baltag and Smets (2008), etc. These may include: having a
multiplicity of agents; modeling different kinds of belief revision (irrevocable,
minimal, etc.: see e.g. van Ditmarsch 2005); and above all, defining dynamic
operators whose semantics is given via model transformations, but which include
content-containment requirements like those of our semantics above, allowing many
hyperintensional distinctions invisible in ‘merely modal’ models.11
A third direction12 would be to go first-order. In the current propositional set-up,
contents can be taken as situations, and fusions thereof. In a semantics for a
predicative language, contents could be thought of in terms of objects (what singular
terms are about) and concepts (what predicates are about), and fusions thereof. In
the hyperintensional camp, of course, the main topic would be the one of Frege’s
informative identities: how Lois can (come to) believe that Clark Kent is in love
with her, without (coming to) believe that Superman is in love with her.
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